The Decision to Intervene was published by Princeton University Press in 1958, completing Kennan’s two-volume study of Soviet-American Relations 1917–1920. It covers the period from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918) to the Armistice (November 1918), focusing on the American decision to send troops to northern Russia and Siberia — a decision that Kennan regards as one of the great blunders of American foreign policy.
Kennan’s argument is that the intervention was driven not by a coherent strategic purpose but by a tangle of conflicting motives: the desire to reconstitute an Eastern Front against Germany (impossible after Brest-Litovsk), the wish to prevent Allied war supplies from falling into German hands (a legitimate but limited objective), pressure from the French and British (who had their own reasons for wanting to overthrow the Bolsheviks), and vague humanitarian impulses (the Czech Legion, stranded in Siberia, provided a convenient pretext). Wilson agreed to intervention reluctantly, hedged it with conditions that made it ineffective as a military operation, and failed to commit the resources that would have been necessary to achieve any definable objective.
The result was the worst of all possible outcomes: the intervention was too small to threaten the Bolshevik regime, but large enough to give the Bolsheviks a powerful grievance against the West — a grievance they exploited for decades. Kennan regards this as a textbook case of the harm that can be done by well-meaning but confused idealism in foreign policy.
Collecting The Decision to Intervene
First edition (Princeton University Press, 1958): Cloth binding, dust jacket.
Market values:
- First edition in dust jacket: $30–$80
- Without jacket: $10–$20
Projected values (2026–2036): Modest appreciation.
The Allied Intervention
The Decision to Intervene (1958) is the second volume of Kennan’s diplomatic history, covering the Allied military intervention in Russia in 1918–19 — the ill-conceived attempt by the Western powers to influence the Russian Civil War. Kennan demonstrates that the intervention was driven more by confusion and interallied politics than by any coherent anti-Bolshevik strategy, and that its primary effect was to deepen Soviet suspicion of the West. The scholarly rigor is immense.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why was this intervention important? The Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War became a founding myth of Soviet foreign policy — “proof” that the capitalist powers would destroy socialism if given the chance. Kennan argues that the intervention’s damage to Soviet-Western relations far outweighed any military benefit.